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Balkan Is Beautiful: Balkanism
in the Political Discourse of
Tudman’s Croatia
Maple Razsa and Nicole Lindstrom*
This article examines the role of Balkanist discourse in Tu¦man’s Croatia.
Todorova’s concept of Balkanism provides a useful theoretical framework
through which to explore the deployment of Balkanist stereotypes against
Croatia by Western leaders. Balkanism also illuminates the ways in which
Croatians used many of these same Balkan stereotypes to differentiate
themselves from their neighbors to the south and east. Through an exami-
nation of Croatian newspaper columns, government documents and
speeches, and political cartoons from the 1990s, this article analyzes how
Balkanist interpretations and representations played an integral role in the
construction of Croatian national identity and the mobilization of Croatians
around a variety of political agendas. The objective of this article is not,
however, simply to document the deployment of Balkanist stereotypes
against or within Croatia. The second component of the article suggests
ways in which Croatia’s liminal position between “Europe” and the “Bal-
kans” might serve as an ideal standpoint from which one might challenge
the binary oppositions of Balkanism and begin to reimagine the Balkans,
redirecting these categories as a site of political engagement and critique.
Keywords: Croatia; Franjo Tu¦man; Balkanism; Balkan
Introduction
When Croatia seceded from the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia in 1991, Croatians were optimistic that their new-
found independence would accomplish two things: Croatia
would be recognized as a sovereign state for the first time in its
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national history and would “return” to its rightful place in Europe.
Croatia’s prospects were encouraging. During the cold war,
Yugoslavs’ relative economic prosperity and freedom to work
and travel abroad made Yugoslavia the envy of Eastern Europe.
1
Jeffrey Sachs selected Yugoslavia in 1989 as one of the first coun-
tries to undergo “shock therapy.” Its advanced economic liberal-
ization and strong civil society tradition promised a quick and
successful transition to a democratic free-market state. Of the six
republics that made up the Yugoslav federation, Croatia was, like
Slovenia, more integrated in to European networks than other
republics due to its Hapsburg legacy, geographical location, and
trade orientation toward Western markets.
In less than ten years, Croatia’s status shifted from first in line
to join the European Union to one of the last. Croatia now lags
behind the economically less advanced states of Romania and
Bulgaria in European Union accession negotiations.
2
Croatia’s
unfavorable position in the eyes of the West undoubtedly
stemmed in part from Franjo Tu¦man’s dismal democratic and
human rights record in the 1990s. The Tu¦man regime sup-
pressed critical media outlets, supported Croatian secessionists
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and fought the extradition of indicted
war criminals to the International Criminal Tribunal for the for-
mer Yugoslavia (ICTY). The Council of Europe cited these rea-
sons for postponing Croatia’s membership until 1996. The Euro-
pean Union raised the same factors in blocking Croatia’s request
to start membership talks in 1997. Refugee return, full coopera-
tion with the ICTY, and commitment to regional cooperation are
conditions of Croatia signing a Stabilization and Association
Agreement with the European Union (a special process created
for “Western Balkan” states in 2000).
3
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1. Susan Woodward, Balkan Tragedy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1993), 20.
2. Croatia’s GDP per capita, in $U.S. at PPP, in 2001 was 9,760 (40 percent of the EU average),
compared to 6,290 in Romania (25 percent of EU average) and 6,840 in Bulgaria (27 percent
of EU average). Romania and Bulgaria signed accession partnerships with the European
Union. World Bank Development Indicators 2000 to 2002, cited in Blue Bird Agenda for Civil
Society in Southeast Europe, in Search of Responsive Government: State Building and Eco-
nomic Growth in the Balkans (Budapest, Hungary: Center for Policy Studies, Central Euro-
pean University, 2003), 14.
3. Croatia signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the European Union in Octo-
ber 2001. The European Union’s relations with South East Europe is outlined at http://
europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/.
The enormous fall in Croatia’s international standing did not
depend solely on Western perceptions of Tu¦man’s political fail-
ings or its economic performance. Croatia’s fall from grace also
involved the deployment of Balkan stereotypes by Western lead-
ers and journalists—a phenomenon Maria Todorova terms
“Balkanism.” In other words, Balkanism proved a very effective
method of disciplining states like Croatia with strong European
aspirations.
4
The irony, however, is that Croatians deployed simi-
lar Balkan stereotypes to differentiate themselves from their eth-
nic neighbors. Balkanist rhetoric was utilized to legitimize
Croatia’s quest for independence as a necessary emancipation
from its “Balkan burden” and its return to its rightful place in
Europe. Croatians presented themselves as more progressive,
prosperous, hard working, tolerant, democratic, or, in a word,
European, in contrast to their primitive, lazy, intolerant, or Bal-
kan, neighbors to the southeast.
5
This article examines the discursive processes through which
Croatian leaders framed their so-called exit from the Balkans and
return to Europe throughout the 1990s. The first section provides
a brief review of the work of Todorova and others who critically
examine the external and internal symbolic representations of
the Balkans. The second part traces Croatia’s fall from grace, from
the euphoric declarations of returning to Europe in the early
1990s to lamentations by the late 1990s of being relegated to the
status of a small, marginal, autocratic state. The third part
examines three discursive strategies by which Croatian leaders
define their respective visions of Croatian national identity based
on quite different conceptions of what they see as essential Euro-
pean norms and values. We show that the Europe-Balkan dichot-
omy is an important element of national self-understanding in all
three cases; yet Europe always stands outside the nation, as an
identity to be achieved.
6
The concluding section considers how
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4. Maria Todorova, Imagining the Balkans (London: Oxford University Press, 1997), 88.
5. Milica Bakic !-Hayden and Robert Hayden, “Orientalist Variations on the Theme ‘Balkans’:
Symbolic Geography in Recent Yugoslav Cultural Politics,” Slavic Review 51 (Spring 1992):
1-10.
6. See Susan Gal, “Bartók’s Funeral: 1991 Representations of Europe in Hungarian Political
Rhetoric,” American Ethnologist 18:3(1991): 440-58. Gal suggests the rhetorical slogan
“return to Europe” implies such a duality, for one must return to a place where one currently
does not belong.
negative representations of the Balkans might be critically exam-
ined to reimagine the Balkans as a site of positive engagement
and critique.
Imagining the Balkans
The burgeoning literature on Balkanism provides a useful
framework in which to examine the forms and processes of rep-
resentation through which Croatian leaders negotiated their so-
called final exit from the Balkans and return to Europe. Maria
Todorova and other scholars seek to critically examine how a
geographically and historically defined place—the Balkan penin-
sula—has become a symbol imbued with a host of derogatory
meaning.
7
To varying extents, these scholars are all indebted to
Edward Said’s Orientalism, a seminal critique of Western knowl-
edge and representations of the East. They hold differing opin-
ions, however, over the extent to which Balkanism can be inter-
preted within a general Orientalist or postcolonial frame.
In Imagining the Balkans, Todorova traces the genealogy of
Balkanism through the travel writings of Western authors to
explore how the term “Balkan” has been negatively constructed
over the past three centuries. Todorova divides the evolution of
Balkanism into three stages:
1. The Balkans were first “discovered” in the late eighteenth century
by Western travelers. Although these first Western accounts of the
Balkans contained some geographical inaccuracies, their treat-
ment of the Balkans was primarily classificatory and descriptive.
2. After a series of Balkan wars and with the advent of World War I,
the Balkans were increasingly imbued with “political, social, cul-
tural, and ideological overtones,” and “Balkan” was increasingly
used as a pejorative term.
3. Today the term “Balkan” has been almost completely disassoci-
ated from its object, as journalists and academics utilize the con-
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7. Other works in this tradition include Dušan Bjelic ! and Obrad Savic !, Balkan as Metaphor
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002); K. E. Fleming, “Orientalism, the Balkans, and Balkan
Historiography,” American Historical Review 105:4(2000): 1218-33; Patrick Hyder Patterson,
“On the Edge of Reason: The Boundaries of Balkanism in Slovenian, Austrian, and Italian
Discourse,” Slavic Review 62:1(Spring 2003): 110-41; Vesna Goldsworthy, Inventing
Ruritania: The Imperialism of the Imagination (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1998).
struct of the Balkans as a powerful symbol conveniently located
outside any spatial or temporal contexts.
8
“Balkanization” has now come to signify more generally the dis-
integration of viable nation-states and the reversion to “the tribal,
the backward, the primitive, the barbarian.”
9
These Balkan ste-
reotypes were reinvigorated by the recent wars in the former
Yugoslavia, which were often termed Balkan wars despite the
fact they were confined to former Yugoslav republics.
Todorova’s archaeological approach to the study of the Bal-
kans and Balkanism shares much with Edward Said’s analyses of
Orientalism. Said explores how European culture managed and
produced the East “politically, sociologically, ideologically, sci-
entifically and imaginatively” through discourses on the Orient,
or what he has termed “Orientalism.”
10
By construing the “Orient”
as the essentialized “other,” through a dichotomous and
essentialist system of representations embodied in stereotypes,
Western writers have strengthened the West’s own self-image as
the superior civilization. Todorova shows how a similar phenom-
enon exists between the Balkans and Europe. She writes,
Geographically inextricable from Europe, yet culturally constructed
as “the other,” the Balkans became, in time, the object of a number of
externalized political, ideological and cultural frustrations and have
served as a repository of negative characteristics against which a posi-
tive and self-congratulatory image of the “European” and “the West”
has been constructed.
11
While Orientalism is a “discourse about an imputed opposition,”
Todorova argues that Balkanism is a “discourse about an imputed
ambiguity.”
12
Here Todorova differs from other Balkan theorists
in the Orientalist tradition such as Bakic !-Hayden and Hayden,
who argue that Balkanism can indeed be viewed as a “variation
on the Orientalist theme,” since the Balkans were long under
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11. Todorova, “The Balkans: From Discovery to Invention,” 455.
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Ottoman rule and, hence, have since been considered part of the
“Orient.”
13
Todorova argues that the Balkans are a part of Europe,
albeit a provincial or peripheral part for the last several centuries.
Balkanism, according to Todorova, treats the differences within
one type—“Europe”—rather than the difference between
imputed types (i.e., the “Occident” and the “Orient”). The Bal-
kans, in other words, despite its geographical status as European,
has become Europe’s shadow, the structurally despised alter ego,
the dark side within.
14
From Europe to the Balkans: Croatia’s
“fall from grace” in the 1990s
Balkanism has been a common discursive tool deployed by
the West to explain and justify Croatia’s enormous fall in interna-
tional standing. When Croatia and Slovenia declared independ-
ence in June 1991, a consensus existed among the international
community that Yugoslavia should be preserved to guarantee
stability. By the end of the year, with nearly one-third of Croatian
territory under Serbian control and medieval Dubrovnik under
siege, Western leaders and media now portrayed Croatia as an
emerging European democracy to be defended against Slobodan
Miloševic !’s expansionist aims. Germany took the lead in recog-
nizing Croatia in December 1991. By April 1992, the international
community recognized Croatia as a sovereign state.
Croatia’s image as a victim of Serb aggression was soon tar-
nished by its involvement in the 1992 to 1995 war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Tu¦man and the Croatian armed forces supported
the Bosnian Croats against the Bosnian Serbs, then against the
Bosniak Muslims. Television footage of the Croatian armed
forces’ shelling of the Muslim quarters of the Bosnian town of
Mostar, and the collapse of the historic bridge across the Neretva,
soon supplanted footage of Serbian shelling of Croatian targets.
Croatia now assumed a more ambivalent role in Western media
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accounts as both an aggressor and victim. In the summer of 1995,
the Croatian army retook most of Croatia’s occupied territory,
forcing thousands of Croatian Serbs to flee to Bosnia and Serbia.
Soon after, Tu¦man signed the Dayton peace accords ending the
war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Tu¦man’s long-term aspirations to
return Croatia to Europe were thwarted when the European
Union decided in 1997 not to invite Croatia to start membership
talks, criticizing the Tu¦man regime’s authoritarian tendencies.
By the late 1990s, many Western leaders viewed Croatia as
another autocratic and expansionist Balkan regime.
An episode during a 1997 conference in Zagreb, “Post-Dayton
Croatia,” typifies how Balkanism became an effective means of
disciplining states like Croatia that aspire to be recognized as
European. In front of an audience of luminaries including the
Croatian minister of defense and other prominent representatives
of Croatian political and academic communities, the U.S. charge
d’affaires of the U.S. embassy in Bosnia-Herzegovina stopped in
the middle of a biting critique of the contemporary Croatian polit-
ical situation. He remarked, pointedly and with obvious calcula-
tion, “In the Balkans . . . and when I say Balkans I mean here in
Croatia.” Clearly aware of Croatian pretensions to join a more
prestigious civilizational camp, the U.S. official let the assembled
Croatian elites know that their inclusion in the European Union
was currently unfeasible. He also reminded them that Western
leaders ultimately decided who was European and who would
be kept out of the club.
Western policy makers are not the only ones to use Balkanism
as a discursive tool to reprimand Croatia in the 1990s. Balkanism
has also played an important role in the construction of Croatian
national identity during the period. In the period prior to and
subsequent to the outbreak of war in July 1991, Croatian leaders
aimed to promote an identity that would be maximally differenti-
ated from its Yugoslav identity and other constituent nationalities
that made up the former Yugoslavia, most significantly, Serbia.
Serbia and Croatia have historically been closely linked: more
than 10 percent of Croatia’s population is ethnically Serb, the Ser-
bian and Croatian languages are linguistically very similar, and
Croats and Serbs are both considered “ethnically” Slav. Serbia
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also posed a genuine military threat to Croatia’s independence
and territorial integrity. Thus, this process of differentiation was
quite acute, and Balkanist discourse filled an important
ideological role.
A political cartoon published in the Croatian daily Slobodna
Dalmacija early in 1992 illustrates how Balkanism was deployed
soon after Croatia’s independence. Figure 1 highlights the sense
of optimism shared by most Croatians, who believed that inde-
pendent Croatia would soon “sail” into Europe, leaving their
primitive Balkan neighbors and communist past behind. Serbs
are represented as primitive cavemen, huddled under their
nationalist insignia with their Yugoslav national army helmet
beside them. The Croatian figure is donned in an overcoat, wav-
ing farewell with a kerchief of the Croatian “šahovnica” (a Cro-
East European Politics and Societies 635
Figure 1: At the beginning of the conflict with Serbia, many
Croatians were optimistic they would sail into Europe
Source: Croatian Ministry of Information, 1992.
atian national symbol) in hand. A sail made of the European
Union flag powers the continental drift.
15
By 1993, Croatia’s quest to rejoin Europe proved to be more
difficult than originally anticipated. Figure 2 suggests how Cro-
atians feared being symbolically placed into an entirely different
geographical sphere. Footage from the civil war in Yugoslavia
shown on Western television screens now associated Croatia not
with the states of Europe but with the violence of the wars in Viet-
nam and Southeast Asia. Croatia’s exasperation of the change in
fortune is captured in a 1997 front cover of the Croatian political
weekly magazine, Tjednik (Figure 3) where Croatia is depicted as
the fair-haired girl whom no one in the world will ask to dance.
The headline poses the question, “Zašto nas ne vole?” (Why
Don’t the Great Powers Love Us?).
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Figure 2: Croatia’s position in global symbolic geography
proved to be quite changeable
Source: Croatian Ministry of Information, 1992.
Figure 3 captures some of the bewilderment Croatians felt at
the change in their fortune. Croatia’s reputation shifted from
being a promising emerging democracy that European and U.S.
leaders pledged to support and protect in the early 1990s to an
international pariah by 1997.
Despite attempts to displace or externalize charges of
Balkanism, the Croatian case is indicative of Todorova’s claim
that the “outside perception of the Balkans has been internalized
in the region itself.”
16
The main way in which Balkanism has been
internalized in Croatia is through internal differentiation based
on imputed Balkan characteristics; what Bakic !-Hayden describes
as “nesting orientalisms.” An endless chain of differentiation can
occur between nations, whereby Croatia is Balkan vis-à-vis Ger-
many, Serbia is Balkan vis-à-vis Croatia, Kosovo is Balkan vis-à-
vis Serbia, and so on. Orientalism can also be nested within
nations.
17
One can perceive a social hierarchy in Croatia that cor-
responds to the notion of where the Balkan begins and Europe
ends. The Sava River serves as one common dividing line, where
the less prosperous, socialist-era, southern suburbs of Zagreb are
considered Balkan vis-à-vis Zagreb’s old “European” center.
18
The former military frontier (or the “Krajina”) also creates an
internal barrier between northern Croatia and its southern Bal-
kan border region. When Herzegovinian Croatians became an
increasing liability to the Croatian government in the late 1990s—
politically by obstructing the implementation of the Dayton
agreement and economically by siphoning Croatian state
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16. Todorova, Imagining the Balkans, 39.
17. Bridget Bereton argues that in a poly-ethnic hierarchy, the less powerful group
undercommunicates its distinctiveness in relation to the more powerful group, while the
more powerful group tends to overcommunicate its difference. One could argue a similar
dynamic has occurred in southeastern Europe, where Croatians undercommunicate their
difference vis-à-vis more powerful Europe but overcommunicate their differences vis-à-vis
the less powerful Serbian (or Bosnian Muslims or Roma). Bridget Bereton, Race Relations
in Colonial Trinidad, 1870-1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 32.
18. The cover of a 2000 Croatian tourist brochure declares Zagreb “The New European
Metropolis.”
19. The Croatian weekly Feral Tribune declared, for example, that Herzegovinian Croats were
the “new Serbs.” Toni Gabric !, “Hercegovci su na?i novi srbi” [Herzegovinians Are Our New
Serbs], Feral Tribune, 24 August 1997. The nationalist Hrvatski Obzor acknowledged that
the West now identified Croatia with its less developed counterparts in Bosnia. Its 1999
cover, with white socks hanging from a clothesline (white socks symbolizing gauche, and
decidedly non-European, fashion), declared, “Svi smo mi Hercegovci” [We are all
Herzegovinians now]. Hrvatski Obzor, 21 September 1999.
funds—many Croatians began to draw the border of the Balkans
between Bosnian Croatians and citizens of Croatia proper.
19
In sum, critical conflicts in Croatia throughout the 1990s were
shaped by the “politics of recognition” whereby Croatians
sought, and ultimately failed, to be recognized by Western lead-
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Figure 3: A 1997 Croatian liberal weekly, Tjednik, asks incred-
ulously, “Why don’t they love us?”
ers as authentically European. Balkanist discourse provided one
means of dissociating Croatia from its Balkan neighbors and thus
reclaiming its perceived rightful place in Europe. Croatia’s dra-
matic “fall from grace” throughout the 1990s can help explain
Croatians’ often overanxious, even paranoid, response to being
identified as Balkan. Boris Buden suggests that Balkanist dis-
course in Croatia might indeed be an “expression of the deepest
frustration caused by the fact that Croatia is never really recog-
nized in the vision of its own European identity precisely in the
only place in which that recognition matters—in Europe itself.”
20
While Tu¦man used Balkanist dichotomies adeptly to secure
Croatia’s independence and rally Western support in the early
1990s, by the mid-1990s this consensus had unraveled. Vesna
Pusic! stated in 1995 that the critical issue facing Croatia was
determining “who will prevail in defining the character of
Croatia, who will determine its identity and on which values,
political attitudes, models and strategies its image will be con-
structed.”
21
In the following section, we examine how public
debates over the meaning of Croatian identity and Croatia’s polit-
ical and social future were fought within the confines of the Bal-
kan-Europe dichotomy. Although many prominent Croatians
sought to identify Croatia as Europe in contrast to the Balkans,
they imbued both these terms with different meanings in further-
ing very different political agendas.
Balkanism and its critics:
three discursive strategies
“Tu¦man, not the Balkans” was the slogan on which Croatian
President Franjo Tu¦man based his successful 1997 presidential
campaign. The slogan captured what Tu¦man saw as his greatest
historical achievement: Croatia’s extrication from what one writer
termed “the Balkan darkness of the so-called Yugoslavia.”
22
In the
post-Dayton era, the general euphoria following Croatian inde-
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pendence was waning and Croatians faced high unemployment
and inflation. Tu¦man could no longer rely solely on military or
diplomatic achievements to maintain his political power.
Tu¦man found the perfect solution to this dilemma in the South-
east European Cooperation Initiative (SECI). The United States
and the European Union initiated SECI to promote economic
exchange within Southeastern Europe (including all the former
Yugoslavia states, Albania, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria).
The slogan “Tu¦man, not the Balkans” perfectly articulated his
stand on this new crisis. SECI was not intended to create a “new-
Yugoslavia”; nor did it legally bind Croatia to the agreement.
23
Nevertheless, it was nearly impossible to turn on a television or
radio or to open a newspaper in Croatia in 1997 without learning
of the danger of a world conspiracy to force Croatia “back onto
the Balkans.” Tu¦man, once again, would save Croatia from this
fate.
A 1997 cover of the Croatian state-run news weekly Hrvatski
Obzor illustrates how SECI was represented by the ruling regime.
The cover, shown in Figure 4, is dominated by a close-up of a
Yugo with a headline that asks, “Hoc!emo li ponovo voziti
‘yugo’ ” [Will We Drive Yugos Again?]. The Yugo was a symbol of
what Croatians viewed as their disadvantaged status vis-à-vis the
Serbs in Yugoslav economic relations (not to mention a source of
international embarrassment), since the Yugo was manufactured
in Serbia but was aggressively marketed among all other repub-
lics as Yugoslavia’s national automobile. The headline, therefore,
by citing renewed economic ties through SECI, reinvigorated the
threat that once again Croatia would fall victim to Serbian hege-
monic aspirations. In the upper right hand corner, however, the
same cover provided the answer to this threat. Beside a picture of
Tu¦man, the caption declared that, “Croatia still needs Tu¦man.”
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23. Both the EU and the United States insisted that membership in the Southeast European
Cooperation Initiative (SECI) would be voluntary. Ivo Banac, professor of history at Yale
University and frequent commentator on Croatian politics, stated in an interview for a Cro-
atian weekly, “I really don’t see anyone in the West who would force the renewal of Yugo-
slavia or the creation of some sort of Balkan confederation. That is completely unrealistic.”
Feral Tribune, 13 January 1997.
During his televised State of the Union Address in January
1997, Tu¦man made his stand on SECI official by passing a con-
stitutional amendment banning Croatia’s participation in Balkan
associations. He proclaimed,
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Figure 4: The conservative weekly Hrvatski Obzor proclaimed
in 1997, “Croatia still needs Tu¦man”
By its geopolitical position, by all of its fourteen-century history, by its
civilization and culture, Croatia belongs to the Central European and
Mediterranean circles of Europe. Our political links with the Balkans
between 1918 and 1990 were just a short episode in Croatian history
and we are determined not to repeat that episode again.
24
Underlying his political opposition to Western attempts to force
Croatia into some new Balkan union, therefore, was the outrage
that Croatia could be misrecognized as culturally Balkan.
25
By
fostering a sense of crisis, Tu¦man could demonstrate he was a
strong and vital leader. Tu¦man not only would protect Croatia
from the Serbian threat; he would stand up to the “Great Powers”
who now threatened Croatia’s national interests.
26
Tu¦man was not the only politician to utilize Balkanism as a
rhetorical strategy. In his 1997 presidential campaign, Croatian
Social Liberal Party candidate Vlado Gotovac criticized the “Bal-
kan tendencies” of Tu¦man and, in contrast, portrayed himself as
a European leader. As part of his campaign strategy, Gotovac
capitalized on the fact that Croatia was not invited to the 1997
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26. Dalibor Foretic !, in the independent daily Novi List, captures this dynamic: “The world
would like to push us into some kind of Balkan hole but we will not allow them. We want to
be everything—Central European, Mediterranean, Transcarpathian—and not just a Balkan
country. The West is constantly inventing some kind of initiative to push us where we do
not belong. But we will not let them! Our leaders persistently and bravely shout that Croatia
will not enter some new Balkan integration,” 6 October 1996, quoted in Dunja Rihtman-
Auguštin, “Zašto I otkad se grozimo balkana?” [Why, and since When, Are We So Afraid of
the Balkans?], Erasmus 12:4(1996, 45).
meeting of the presidents of Central European states, the region
to which Tu¦man repeatedly declared that Croatia belonged. In
an article titled “Croatia Excluded from the Central European
Milieu,” Gotovac wrote,
The absence of the Croatian chief of state from that kind of a gather-
ing not only sends a message that Croatia does not belong to the Cen-
tral European geopolitical space. It is also clear proof that Dr. Franjo
Tu¦man himself, as the key protagonist of Balkan, anti-European pol-
itics, does not have access to the company of eight Central European
leaders. This is a clear warning that our Republic with Tu¦man and
his nomenclature has mired us in deep isolation, leaving us hope-
lessly anchored to the Balkan.
27
Tu¦man’s authoritarian regime, in other words, with its violations
of human rights and its increasing isolationist policies, not the
West, was to be blamed for anchoring Croatia to the Balkan.
Critics of both the ruling regime and the liberal opposition also
utilized Balkanist rhetoric. Boris Buden’s vociferous and radical
critiques of Tu¦man demonstrated a certain ambivalence regard-
ing Croatia’s relationship to the Balkans. In response to Tu¦man’s
proposed constitutional ban on associations with Balkan states,
for example, Buden wrote with alarm, “One of the most impor-
tant elements in Croatian nationalist ideology—the dichotomous
construct of ‘Europe-Balkan’—will now be given a place in the
basic document of the Croatian state, its Constitution!”
28
In an
essay two weeks later on the popular demonstrations against
Miloševic ! in Belgrade, Buden put the binary opposition to an
ideological use of his own. Buden praised Serbian citizens for
finally rising up against Miloševic !, writing that, in doing so, they
had become a symbol of “Europe.” Juxtaposing the democratic
demonstrations in Serbia with the complacency of Croatians
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towards the Tu¦man regime, Buden argues that Zagreb, not Bel-
grade, is the true “Balkan Palanka.”
29
Neither Tu¦man nor Gotovac would call Zagreb Balkan, let
alone using the terminology of Serbian philosopher. However,
Buden is reluctant to categorically define Zagreb as more “primi-
tive” than Belgrade, conceding that there is a “possible objection
that not everyone in Zagreb is a primitive Balkanite and that there
are absolutely and relatively far more of that kind in Belgrade.”
30
Although his intention is to incite protest, to spark more dramatic
resistance to the Tu¦man regime, Buden shares the underlying
Balkanist orientation that “Balkan” is associated with all that is
dark and, conversely, “Europe” with all that is light.
We draw several conclusions from these three cases. First,
these examples illustrate how Balkanism pervaded Croatian
political discourse throughout the 1990s. Tu¦man, Gotovac, and
Buden all utilize a Balkanist framework in their political rhetoric,
despite their significantly different ideological standpoints and
political objectives. As Verdery argues, “To the extent that debate
promotes unspoken agreement—however circumscribed—on
certain fundamental premises, then one can speak of this as a ‘le-
gitimating outcome’ or ‘legitimating moment.’ ”
31
The unspoken
agreement or “legitimating outcome” of Croatian political dis-
course in the 1990s, in other words, was defining Croatian iden-
tity as European in opposition to the Balkans. This fundamental
construction was also evident in academic analyses of the phe-
nomena. For example, when an interviewer asked Ivan Siber,
professor of political science at Zagreb University, “How do you
comment on the slogan of the HDZ ‘Tu¦man, and not the Bal-
kan?’ ” Siber responded, “ ‘Tu¦man, and not the Balkans is a dis-
tinctly Balkan slogan. . . . The kontrapunkt to the Balkans is
Europe not Tu¦man.”
32
The point here is not to simply expose the
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use of Balkanist rhetoric in public discourse but to show how
Balkanism was a key discursive means of articulating Croatian
national identity in the 1990s.
A second insight from these examples of Balkanism lies in the
tension between the insistence of concretizing Croatia’s place in
“Europe” and awareness that its status as European is ontologi-
cally insecure. For instance, Tu¦man repeatedly insisted that
Croatia’s fourteen-century old European cultural heritage
ensured that Croatia would quickly return to its rightful place in
Europe. At the same time, however, Tu¦man pursued an aggres-
sive lobbying campaign at home and abroad to promote Croatia’s
Europeaness and to resist being identified as Balkan by European
leaders. Similarly, Gotovac frequently asserted Croatia’s Central
European identity, yet noted Croatia’s absence from meetings of
Central European states. Buden claimed that while Belgrade is
symbolically more European, there are numerically more primi-
tive Balkanites in Belgrade than in Zagreb. All three figures, in
other words, insist that Croatia belongs to Europe in a secure
ontological sense, yet none can ignore Croatia’s fall from grace
throughout the 1990s. Each knows that those on the periphery of
Europe are particularly vulnerable to the vagaries of the changing
social and political map of Europe. They are aware, like
Todorova asserts, that “ ‘Europe’ ends where politicians want it to
end.”
33
Finally, while all three of these political actors share the same
discursive Balkanist frame of Europe/Balkan, each imbues these
categories with different meaning. The positive attributes that
Tu¦man, Gotovac, and Buden attribute to “Europe” vary.
Tu¦man clearly focused on the cultural cachet of Europe as well
as the political and military security that comes with European
membership. Gotovac mobilized his opposition to Tu¦man
around a liberal conception of Europe that entailed a respect of
the parliamentary rule of law, democratic norms, and the sanctity
of rights. Buden evoked the European tradition of
antiauthoritarianism and political protest to inspire resistance
against the Tu¦man regime. Each construction of Europe
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reflected each man’s respective vision of Croatia’s future. All
three political agendas were imagined within the confines of
Balkanism. In the following section, we suggest how this
Balkanism framework might be challenged or “reimagined” as a
site of political engagement and critique.
Concluding remarks: Reimagining the Balkans
As we have shown above, Balkanism—a dichotomous and
essentialist system of representations embodied in stereotypes
around which Europe has set itself apart from a Balkan “other”—
has served a discursive means by which Croats would liberate
themselves from their perceived Balkan burden and return to
Europe. When Croatia found itself in the position of being both a
recipient and purveyor of Balkanist stereotypes, it spurred a
number of different responses. It stimulated anti-Western back-
lash, intensified efforts to distinguish Croatia more aggressively
from its Balkan neighbors, and resulted, in some cases, in an
internalization of these stereotypes, either through a kind of self-
hatred or through the promotion of an internal hierarchy based
on Balkanist criteria. This change in fortune provoked little criti-
cal inquiry in Croatia as to why the discourse of Balkanism devel-
oped and continues to have such salience in Europe and its
periphery. Most criticism directed toward the West stemmed from
resentment at not being recognized as European—or for being
misrecognized as Balkan.
Todorova and others in the Balkanist tradition have taken up
this task. Many analysts attribute the extreme nationalism and
ethnic violence that followed the breakup of Yugoslavia to pri-
mordial hatreds and a proclivity toward violence unique to the
Balkans (and, subsequently, antithetical to the Western Enlight-
enment tradition).
34
Todorova suggests that the Yugoslav con-
flicts in the 1990s, wrongly attributed to some Balkan essence,
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actually marked the ultimate Europeanization of the Balkans.
35
Similarly, Slavoj Z #iz #ek suggests that what Europe may be afraid to
recognize in the recent Yugoslav war is the violent origin of its
own system of nation-states. The modern European system of
sovereign states, Z #iz #ek reminds us, is “the result of several centu-
ries of social engineering—ethnic and religious war and expul-
sions accompanying the process of centralization—triggered by
a fundamental hostility to heterogeneity. Which in the end
brought about relatively homogeneous politics produced by the
development of modern nation-states.”
36
When Yugoslavia disintegrated, what some might term its
“Ottoman legacy”—characterized by multinational statehood,
decentralization, and regional diversity—was finally reorganized
into the nationalist rubric of a centralized state system and a sin-
gle unified national culture. Since Croatia was recognized in 1991
as an independent state, Croatia has been engaged in such a
nationalizing project. Tu¦man placed the Dalmatian and Istrian
regions under Zagreb control. His regime also promoted a single
unified culture through institutions such as Matica Hrvatska that
work to “preserve” the purity of Croatian language and culture.
In general, official Croatia has systematically worked toward the
production of an exclusively Croatian nationhood and its histori-
cal imaginary into the institutional tissue of its state, a project that
most European states have long since “achieved.” This issue cer-
tainly warrants further study, not simply to better understand the
particularities of Croatian nationalism; one can consider how the
project of radical nation building is embedded in the very project
of modernization and Europeanization.
37
What are some of the political consequences of entangling this
nation-building process with Balkanism and within a cultural
hierarchy that privileges all that is “European” over all that is “Bal-
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kan”? For one, any organization of Croatian identity along dichot-
omous Balkan/European lines masks Croatian ethnic preoccupa-
tions with the Serbs. Among many Croats, Serbs are seen as the
epitome of a Balkan people. Defining “Croatianess” in opposi-
tion to “Balkaness” fosters animosity toward Croatia’s largest
minority and important neighbor. Moreover, by deploying
Balkanism against those to its south and east, Croatians accept a
social hierarchy based on cultural characteristics that, as we have
shown, has hindered Croatia’s own European membership aspi-
rations. In other words, although Croatia might define itself as
more European vis-à-vis Serbia according to cultural and geo-
graphic criteria, it is ultimately the European Union that deter-
mines Croatia’s geopolitical status. This strategy of differentiation
appears increasingly problematic given that Croatia is destined to
remain with Serbia in the European Union’s “Western Balkans”
group of applicant states for the foreseeable future.
Croatia’s perceived failure to be recognized as European does
not necessarily have to result in an externalization or internaliza-
tion of cultural hierarchies. We share Z #iz #ek’s cautious optimism
that by being forced to live out and sustain the competing and
often contradictory demands of the national and transnational,
the inside/outside, Central and East Europeans are located in a
privileged position to invent creative ways out of this dilemma.
38
Croatia has an ideal vantage point from which to articulate such a
narrative, for Croatia has long been placed on both sides of
important historical and geographical divides: classified as both
Byzantine and Catholic, Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian, Eastern
and Western, Balkan and European. At times, Croatians have
embraced this in-between position, causing Croatian nationalist
Eugen Kvaternik to proclaim in 1868, for example, “Croats are
the most magnificent nation in Europe. They took possession of
this blessed country and forever developed a true way of com-
municating between the Christians of the East and the Christians
of the West. Show me a feat such as that in any other contempo-
rary nation!”
39
More typically, Croatians have either enthusiasti-
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cally or grudgingly accepted their role as the “defense walls of
Christianity” (antemurale christianitatis), tasked to defend West-
ern culture against the East.
40
For the most part, they have consid-
ered this border identity as an obstacle to achieving their own
autonomous nation-state and privileged place in Europe. Cro-
atians might turn to the experiences of other peripheral Euro-
pean states to begin to explore the “radical ambivalence” of
being situated in this middle ground.
41
Todorova suggests that it may be hardly realistic to expect
nation-states designated as Balkan to create a “liberal, tolerant,
all-embracing identity celebrating ambiguity and a negation of
essentialism” in the face of “persistent hegemonic discourse from
the West, continuously disparaging about the Balkans, which
sends out messages about the politicization of essentialized cul-
tural differences.”
42
What is genrally true of nation-states in gen-
eral is perhaps more true of Croatia given the trauma of its recent
past. Much of contemporary cultural studies focus on the poten-
tial for cultural resistance in the appropriation and redeployment
of dominant discourses or the search for organic counterhege-
monic articulations. The notion that individuals—or, by exten-
sion, nations—can shape their own processes of signification
fails to examine the degree to which this process is bound by
larger historical and structural factors. It is important to consider
Sherry Ortner’s reminder that “culture controls the definitions of
the world for actors, limits their conceptual tools, and restricts
their emotional repertoires.”
43
Acknowledging these constraints,
it is always possible for those objectified by categories to
reappropriate them, make them one’s own, give them new
meaning, and thereby redirect them as forms of political engage-
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ment and critique.
44
Therefore, just as many African Americans
worked to turn racist representations on their head, Croatians
might one day declare that “Balkan is beautiful.”
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